O discurso de ódio é um limite legítimo ao exercício da liberdade de expressão?: uma análise das teorias de Ronald Dworkin e Jeremy Waldron à luz da herança do liberalismo de John Stuart Mill

Abstract

This paper aims to compare the theories structured by Jeremy Waldron and Ronald Dworkin, in light of John Stuart Mill's liberal legacy, regarding limitations to freedom of expression, specifically in cases of hate speech. It is worth noting that this debate takes place within the specific context of North American liberalism. For this reason, two authors representative of contemporary liberal discourse were chosen. To achieve this goal, the first chapter will outline characteristics of liberal political thought, particularly the contributions it developed regarding the legitimate limits to the exercise of freedom of expression. Next, Waldron's proposal regarding the possible regulation of speech based on content will be presented, in connection with his defense of dignity. It will also be argued that this author expands the concept of harm, defended by Mill, extending it to hypotheses of moral and psychological harm. Finally, Dworkin's arguments in favor of freedom in the strongest sense will be presented, which implies that the State must treat all opinions and convictions with equal respect and consideration, including in cases of hate speech.