Impossibilidade de responsabilização penal dos entes coletivos no Brasil face à dogmática penal

Abstract

The work deals with the criminal liability of the legal entity from the perspective of the finalist theory of human action, which has Hans Welzel as a precursor in the mid-twentieth century (1930-1960). Specifically, it seeks to analyze the foundations that make the criminal liability of the collective entity unfeasible according to the theory mostly adopted by the Brazilian doctrine: Human conduct as voluntary behavior psychically directed to an end. However, from this premise, new clashes, divergences and interpretations arise. Many scholars have questioned this interpretation, considering it outdated from the point of view of the new corporate criminality, adopting a pragmatic bias for the purposes of applying criminal law. Thus, in the first place, the problem is analyzed from a practical point of view and its treatment by doctrine and higher courts as the outdated theory of objective imputation and who can appear as the defendant in the crime for purposes of general criminal liability; then, the problematics are presented from a dogmatic point of view for the adoption of this responsibility in Brazil in the face of the theory of crime, as well as some criticisms from the doctrinal point of view of the criminal responsibility of legal entities. Finally, a critical appraisal is made, seeking to show some limitations of the modern interpretation of the theory of crime for the purpose of arbitrary punishment in detriment of its application.