Atuação normativa: Supremo Tribunal Federal como legislador ocasional

Abstract

The dissertation aims to comment on the normative performance of the Federal Supreme Court (STF), having as an examination outline the explanation of the substantial and procedural currents. In this point of view, the purpose of this document is to clarify the occurrence of the normative action of the STF from the perspective of the integrity of the law. It is worth clarifying, corresponding to the normative performance to the magistrate's procedure of legislating occasionally, using the policy standard and not the principles or rules. Thus, the general objective is to analyze the possibility of normative action by the STF, through an occasional legislation procedure, maximum when of the STF uses the policy standard as a decision parameter. The research was based on the hypothetical-deductive method in a bibliographic study with a qualitative approach. In these terms, integrity adds a paradigm of coherence, indicating not only to examine similar cases in the same way, but to identify the presence of a rational justification model for judicial decisions, based on a principled reading of the entire legal system. The repercussions regulate the imposition of a discernment about the decision parameter used by the STF when pronouncing its judgments. From this point of view, the judgment based on integrity as a decision parameter would outline a constructive interpretation of the law. On the other hand, the application of the policy's decision-making standard, portrays a significant constraint to the democratic regime, requiring an improvement of Democracy, in view of the mentioned distortion. The conclusion imposes a legislative change, through the Proposal of Constitutional Amendment, in a diametrically antagonistic sense to that determined by the STF, translating into the feasibility of the legislative reaction, then the holding of Mandatory Public Hearings, specifically when the STF employs policy arguments remodeled in arguments of principles, acting as occasional legislator.